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Summary
The classic security framework from the time of the East–West conflict no longer exists. NATO no
longer faces any conventional threat. The relationship between Russia and the West, hough not con-
stituting a security community, is certainly no longer characterized byhostility. As a result, the nuclear
arsenals of both sides are dwindling: more than one third of the strategic warheads existing in the
1980s have been done away with; according to he stated goals of the START II treaty, by the middle
of the next decade, stocks will stand at less than a quarter of their historic highs. Types of tactical
nuclear weapons have decreased dramatically in number; more than 90 per cent have been deactivated,
and a large number dismantled. Britain and France have also reduced their stocks of nuclear weapons,
albeit by a much more modest extent. Soon Britain will possess only one type of nuclear weapon, and
France only two. The flexibility of the various arsenals has markedly diminished as a result of this
reduction in variety.
These developments have cleared the view to a long-obscured goal of nuclear arms control: a nuclear-
weapon-free world. Our subject here is the international discourse about nuclear disarmament. In
tackling it, we wish to distance ourselves from a view that sees politics merely as an exchange of
blows between 'robust interests' in the arena of power politics, with the accompanying rhetoric serving
merely to spread an ideological and legitimatory smoke-screen over this 'hard core'.
Whether comprehensive nuclear disarmament has any chance of being achieved is, in our view, si-
gnalled firstly—though not exclusively and entirely—by the way in which it is discussed in internatio-
nal politics. It is this discussion that we shall examine here. We shall try, firstly, to establish ow the
justification for, and military and political role of, nuclear weapons i  dealt with in various internatio-
nal forums, in the nuclear-weapon states themselves, and in Germany; secondly, we shall try to gauge
whether, within these debates, any changes can be identified which would permit some kind of dia-
gnosis and prognosis of trends.
The NPT Extension Conference constitutes a dividing-line in this regard. The contracting parties
themselves were at odds about he importance ofnuclear disarmament from the outset. A brief account
of the course of this dispute is therefore given, before the NPT Review and Extension Conference of
spring 1995 is analysed in detail. This conference was of great importance in setting the agenda for the
global discussion about nuclear weapons.
The decision to extend the treaty also marks the start of a new era in the debate about nuclear disar-
mament. The extent to which the disarmament obligations of the nuclear-weapon states, which are not
laid down anywhere lse but in the NPT, were endorsed and concretized was striking. Whereas pre-
viously, the rather ambiguous wording of Article VI could have given the impression that the NWS
were duty-bound to enter into negotiations but not to produce results, and that disarmament was a
process but not necessarily an e d-point, he Principles and Objectives agreed uring the Extension
Conference preclude this interpretation: they talk unequivocally of the complete limination of nuclear
weapons.
In addition, fixing 1996 as the deadline for the halting of tests marked the nuclear-weapon states' first-
ever acceptance of a fixed date for an arms-control measure; and the demand for the immediate com-
mencement of negotiations on a 'cut-off' is tantamount to another deadline. Lastly, there was a c ll for
the 'determined pursuit …of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally';
this is more precise than the vague call to pursue negotiations 'in good faith' contained in Article VI of
the NPT. In his final statement to the conference, the American representative acknowledged this fact:
the ultimate goal, he said, was a nuclear-weapon-free world.
Following the end of the Extension Conference, there was no more disputing the fact that the ultimate
objective was comprehensive nuclear disarmament. However, at the debates conducted within the
framework of the United Nations and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the various parties
now got stuck into deciding 'how', 'how fast', and 'in which forum'. In this matter, the nuclear-weapon
states and the threshold countries that were not party to the NPT occupied the extreme ends of the
spectrum, whilst the non-nuclear-weapon industrialized countries and non-aligned states, with their
various political variants, occupied the space in between.
An overview of all the multilateral forums that deal with nuclear disarmament produces a strangely
ambivalent impression. On the one hand, the nuclear-weapon states do not reject he aim of compre-
hensive disarmament; onthe other hand, they fight shy of any concession, even verbal, that might
propel them into unforeseen, undesired measures. In so doing, however, they also signal that they have
clearly become sensitive to thiskind of pressure—whether it emanates from diplomatic sources or
from world opinion. Their ostentatiously intransigent a titude is therefore as much an expression of
political uncertainty and vulnerability as of strength resulting from de facto p wer. Where this pressu-
re becomes extremely strong, and extends unequivocally to their own allies—as in the case of the test
ban—opportunities arise for concessions that were initially held to be impossible, as in the 'zero thres-
hold' modalities of the ban. The non-aligned countries still display the weakness of frequently going
for a traditional disarmament purism that preserves the cohesiveness of their otherwise disparate mo-
vement, rather than for practical political demands that would do more to advance nuclear disarma-
ment than does 1950s- or 1960s-style rhetorical self-gratification. However, there is a new median
position (e.g. that of South Africa) which may in the long run present more of a threat to the hard-
liners amongst the NWS than do unrealistic New-Delhi-style conjurations.
The effects stemming from the increase in uclear-weapon-free zones merit considerable attention.
This increase ntails a restriction in the scope of the NWS to move freely over the world's oceans, and
to deploy nuclear weapons outside their own territories. This could eventually further undermine the
legitimacy of nuclear-weapons ownership. The signature of the relevant protocols by the NWS has, in
the last two years, led to an ever greater number of states coming to enjoy binding security assurances
from them. The geographical rea within which the threat to use, and the use of, nuclear weapons
would even be legally permissible has thus considerably diminished in size.
Two major international i stitutions—the Canberra Commission for Nuclear Disarmament, created by
a Western-oriented government, namely Australia, and the International Court f Justice in The Ha-
gue, which is addressing the question of the legality of nuclear weapons—constitute new forums for
discussion of the issue. They will undoubtedly help advance the discussion about he future of nuclear
weapons. But how far they can make a practical contribution on the path to a nuclear-weapon-free
world remains to be seen. That contribution will stand or fall according to how the International Court
of Justice's ruling and the recommendations f the Canberra Commission are received, and the extent
to which account is taken of them in future disarmament discourse.
We end our study with a short overview of the national policies and discourses of some of the major
players. The aim of this is not to provide a full, in-depth analysis of the various national debates, but to
highlight he main positions and—where appropriate—identify changes in relation to the status quo
ante.
The positions of the nuclear-weapon states and of the most important of the non-nuclear-weapon sta-
tes, Germany, betray a remarkable ambivalence. In the nuclear-weapon states, the desire to preserve
national status clearly predominates. However, this desire is being overlaid by the growing realization
that nuclear weapons can no longer be decreed a purely national affair, and therefore a t boo subject,
and that disarmament is part and parcel of the transitional legitimation for continued nuclear status.
This paradoxical state of affairs leads to a situation in which the nuclear-weapon states, albeit reluc-
tantly, are subordinating themselves to requirements which, although not a sufficient condition for
nuclear disarmament, are none the less a necessary one—namely, transparency and a restricted scope
for action. But the ambivalence r mains: the process is fragile and could easily be reversed; on the
other hand, the fact that it is now acceptable to raise certain topics in the internal American debate
suggests hat a nuclear-weapon state may consider that its long-term interests are better safeguarded in
a nuclear-weapon-free world.
As far as Germany is concerned, the question it faces is to decide where it stands in this debate, given
its status as a major non-nuclear-weapon state. No clear line is at present discernible, and the debate is
extremely rudimentary. Between Nibelungen-like loyalty to the Western alliance's first-use option and
a spirited attempt to secure greater transparency in the nuclear powers' nuclear-weapon complex, there
is a palette of opinions and attitudes for which no clear common denominator is yet discernible. This is
all the more regrettable in that, in this debate more than any other, Germany's voice carries great
weight, and its absence is constantly being used by advocates of nuclear weapons in ts partner coun-
tries to prove the necessity of their existing arsenals, because otherwise—so they claim—Germany,
feeling itself insecure, could institute its own nuclear option.
The opening-up of a discussion on German security-needs, and the contribution which nuclear wea-
pons make, or do not make, to it, is unavoidable. It has essentially already been rendered inevitable by
the French offer of 'extended deterrence'. It should not be sidestepped.
